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STUDENT COMMENT
LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS—
THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL EXCEPTION
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, private enforcement of civil rights has proven
to be an effective method of vindicating constitutional and legisla-
tive guarantees of freedom and eqUality. Pro bono litigation has also
shown itself effective in areas such as environmental and consumer
protection, which in the last decade have very nearly grown into a
national preoccupation.' In face of administrative stonewalling and
legislative delay, public interest suits have "speeded court definition
of what is required of Federal agencies under environmental protec-
tion statutes. The suits have forced greater sensitivity in both gov-
ernment and industry to environmental considerations. Further-
more, they have educated lawmakers and the public to the need for
new environmental legislation."' The courts have kept pace by
gradually liberalizing traditional rules of standing to allow claims of
actual injury to essentially non-economic values such as the aesthetic
appeal of the outdoors. 3 However,: not a small part of the growth is
due to encouragement of these private actions in the public interest
through the award of attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs in the
federal courts.
In a civil suit in the United States, engaging a lawyer is the first
step in a journey through the courts which may assume transconti-
nental proportions, 4 and, in view of present day docket congestion
and delay, may not be completed for several years. During that time
several trips up and down . the appellate ladder, to the Supreme
Court if necessary and appropriate, may further draw out the time
between the violation of legal rights and their ultimate vindication.
Throughout, both plaintiff and defendant will employ legal coun-
se1, 5 and under what is traditionally referred to as the "American
See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Adminis-
trative Law, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 612-13 '(1970),
2
 U,S. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality: Second Annual Re-
port 155-56 (1971),
E,g„ United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S.
669, 686-90 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-43, 751-52 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
4
 The metaphor is highly appropriate. In Wilderness Soc'y v. Marion, 495 F.2d 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1974), plaintiffs defeated a motion in the district court for a change in venue from
Washington, D.C. to Juneau, Alaska, a move which would have involved not only great cost
and inconvenience, but loss of their highly skilled, Washington-baied pro bono publico
lawyers as well. Id. at 1037-38 n.9.
s For the purposes of this comment, "employment" will be used to mean any arrange-
inent for the provision of legal services involving a lawyer-client relationship. The significance
of there being no obligation to pay for those services is discussed at note 17 infra.
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Rule," each litigant usually will be fully responsible for paying his
own attorney's fees. 6
 Precisely because it is traditional, the Ameri-
can Rule stands in our present day juristic thought as though it is a
tower of steel.' On the other hand, English law has long afforded its
courts the discretion to impose costs, including necessary attorney's
fees, upon the losing litigant. 8
 Furthermore, as commentators have
frequently observed, it was standard practice in many American
courtrooms, up through the middle of the last century, for the
prevailing party to recover at least a part of his attorney's fee from
his opponent, 9
 but "[njo adequate historical explanation for the
departure has ever been advanced, and in any event, the reasons
commonly given—the spirit of individualism in frontier societies, the
conception in earlier times of lawsuits as sporting contests, and the
widespread hostility toward lawyers--are not persuasive now."'
The English Rule allows the shifting of liability for the prevail-
ing party's attorney's fees to someone else, usually but not always
the unsuccessful opponent." This rule, however, is not entirely
foreign to the American legal system. It may be found embodied in
various statutes on both the federal' 2
 and state levels.' 3 Curiously,
the English Rule is the tradition in the stockholder's derivative
action" and in admiralty cases." However, its most significant and
6
 E.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,'386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1963).
There are, of course, exceptions, certain of which are treated throughout this comment.
7
 The Supreme Court regarded the American Rule as firmly entrenched (which was not
really the case) at the time of its first encounter in that tribunal. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S.
(3 Da11.) 306 (1796). It was recently reaffirmed in F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974): "[A]ttorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable
in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefor.' " 417 U.S. at 126,
quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v, Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967). See
notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
a Ehrenzweig, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 26 Calif. St. B.J. 107, 110 (1951). The
Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I., c. 1 (1275), gave to plaintiffs, and the Statute of Westmin-
ster, 4 Jac. I., c. 3 (1607), gave to defendants the full necessary costs of the suit dependent
only upon success in court. Not until 1875 did an element of discretion enter into the award in
law courts. Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77. In equity, costs
were always in the discretion of the court. Riggall v. Hereford County Council, [1972] 1
W.L.R. 171, 174-75 (D.C.); Knight v. Clifton, [1971]'1 Ch. 700, 706-14 (C.A.); Goodhart,
Costs, 38 Yale L.J. 849, 852-54 (1929).
9
 E.g., Ehrenzweig, supra note 8, at 110-14; Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel
Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif. L, Rev. 792, 798-99 (1966). An excellent summary of the
historical basis for the American Rule is found in Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the
Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1216, 1217-21 (1967).
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney's Fees from Funds, 87 Harv. L.
Rev. 1597, 1598 (1973).
11 See text at notes 42-49 infra.
13 E.g., Federal.Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)
(Supp. II, 1972); Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970). See statutes
cited in Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 721 n.17 (1963).
13 E.g., Mass, Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 11 (Supp. 1974); ch. 151, § 1B (1971); N.Y. Civ.
Prac. §§ 8303(a)(2), 8303(a)(4) (McKinney 1963).
14 See Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 658, 667 (1956); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits,
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controversial inroad has been in the area of discretionary equitable
relief where, though always available to some extent (usually as a
punitive measure in cases of bad faith), only recently has it begun to
be used creatively. It has been less than ten years since the Supreme
Court approved the award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs acting as
"private attorneys general."" Just five years ago the Supreme Court
acknowledged that much greater benefit than a monetary fund for
the benefit of the corporation could accrue to individual stockhold-
ers, corporate directors, and the business community in general as a
result of a successful derivative suit.' 7 These and subsequent deci-
sions of the federal courts have enabled small plaintiffs to challenge
large corporate and public defendants in the face of otherwise pro-
hibitively large legal fees."
This comment will examine the so-called "equitable exceptions"
to the American Rule as they affect the growing area of environmen-
tal and civil rights litigation. It is here that a method of recovering
attorney's fees as taxable costs from the losing party would go far
towards both protecting national commitments from the atrophy of
disuse and ameliorating the austerity with which pro bono plaintiffs
and lawyers are faced when they embark upon a suit in the public
interest.
39 Colum. L. Rev. 784, 786 (1939). Such awards are based on the "common fund" theory and
do not therefore represent the "losing defendant" type of fee shift. Because of the nature of
corporate ownership, however, the result in such cases is analytically the same as if a nominal
defendant were to pay the fee, except that the fee is limited generally to a percentage of the
amount recovered for the fund, and the plaintiff himself "pays" a proportionate share, as a
beneficiary of the fund. See section 1(B) in text at notes 42-46 infra.
15 E.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962); The Apollon, 22 U.S (9
Wheat.) 362, 379 (1824).
16
 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterps., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968), The award was
statutorily authorized by 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(b) (1970), but the discretionary provision
previously had been given a restrictive interpretation encompassing only bad faith and
delaying tactics. 390 U.S. at 400-01. See text at notes 59-73, infra.
1./ Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co„ 396 U.S. 375, 394-96 (1970). Such funds, however,
have run into the millions. See Hornstein, The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 658, 668 (1956).
'I E.g., Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1974); Sims v. Amos, 340
F, Supp. 691, 695 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
It is true that the prospect of attorneys' fees does not discourage the litigant from
bringing suit when legal representation is provided without charge. But the entity
providing the free legal services will be so discouraged, and an award of attorneys'
fees encourages it to bring public-minded suits when so requested by litigants who
are unable to pay.
Brandenbarger, 494 F.2d at 889. The gratuitous provision of legal services is not a valid basis
for denying a request for an award of attorney's fees where the award is otherwise appro-
priate, Fairley v. Patterson, 493 F.2d 598, 606-07 (5th Cir. 1974). All that is necessary is that
there has existed an attorney-client relationship, which can exist quite independently of
compensation. Miller v. Amusement Enterps., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1970). See
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 484 F.2d 1331,
1338 n.7 (1st Cir, 1973) (hereinafter cited as NRDC v. EPA); La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57
F.R.D. 94, 98 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709, 711
(E.D. La. 1970), aff'd 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971).
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I. THE AMERICAN RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Not unexpectedly, such a basic departure from our English
common law heritage has engendered considerable debate in legal
journals and legal proceedings alike. 19 On the one hand, proponents
of the American Rule argue: plaintiffs and defendants who are
responsible only for the cost of adequately presenting their respec-
tive views on an issue in controversy are less likely to fear adjudica-
tion of their legal rights, for which the penalty to the losing party or
parties, under the English Rule, would include not only the adverse
judgment but also an additional set of costs. 2° Parties under the
American Rule enter the courtroom as litigative equals, in that they
are each financially responsible to their own counsel for every plea,
every motion, and every delay effected on their behalves, as well as
those occurring naturally. Moreover, economic self-interest will pre-
sumably induce litigants to avoid unnecessary steps rather than
incur an expense therefor. 21
By contrast, the English Rule is seen to effectively "raise the
stakes"22
 of the litigation by placing the burden of supporting
lawyers for both parties on the shoulders of one party, whose
identity before final judgment, or more properly, final resolution on
appeal without remand, is presumably unknown. Turning to their
advantage that which is anathema to the American tradition, the
supporters of the English Rule point to the increased stakes as an
additional inducement to an amicable settlement, thus saving both
court time and further expense. 23 Prevailing parties are made whole
by bringing them back financially to as good a position as they
occupied prior to the litigation, exclusive of whatever pecuniary
benefit they may have received from the suit by way of damages.
Plaintiffs are less apt to bring groundless lawsuits, and defendants
less likely to interpose tenuous defenses, than under the American
'' See, e.g., Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
.301 (1973); Avilla, Shall Counsel Fees Be Allowed?, 13 Calif. St. B.]. 42 (1938). See generally
F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 128 n.15.
z° See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1963);
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, it is important
to note that unsuccessful litigants are still liable for certain costs of the suit even under the
American Rule. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970). See note 21 infra.
2 ' American lawyers are under an ethical duty to expedite the case and avoid undue
delay, in the interests of both the client and the legal system. ABA, Code of Professional
Responsibility DR 7-102(A)(1) (1970). Nor can one party impose added expense upon an
opposing party with impunity in the hope of wearing down his opponent. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure contain specific sanctions with regard to certain bad faith tactics. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(aX4), 37(b)(2)(E), 37(c), 37(d), 56(g). Sanctions include the shifting of attorney's fees
attendant to the delay or inconvenience caused. In addition, the federal courts may always
exercise their equity powers to discipline the obstinate or vexatious litigant. 6 J. Moore,
Federal Practice Ill 54.77 121, at 1709-10 (2d ed. 1974).
22
 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
23
 See Geller, Unreasonable Refusal to Settle and Calendar Congestion—Suggested Rem-
edy, 1962 Proceedings of ABA Section on International and Comparative Law 134, 135
(1963).
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Rule, where liabilities for attorney's fees normally are not nearly as
great.
From a positive point of view, under the English Rule, ag-
grieved persons need not hesitate to vindicate their legal rights, for
to do so will entail no liability for legal fees. 24 On the other hand,
the spectre of multiple liability may, as the supporters of the Ameri-
can Rule fear, discourage parties from bringing meritorious claims
or from defending against groundless charges out of fear that a
judge or jury might hold against them. 25
Thus, these are the basic arguments in the debate over the
American and English rules as to liability for attorney's fees. 26 They
clearly indicate a common concern with the financial demands of
justice in a modern legal system, but they also demonstrate a
philosophical split as to how those burdens are best allocated among
the interested parties. Each system will vindicate a worthy litigant's
rights. However, only the English system will make the vindication
complete. 27
It is not the posture of this comment that the English Rule is
the best mode of financing all legal representation, or that it should
completely supplant the American Rule. It is submitted that fee
shifting is the more desirable practice with regard to allocating the
full costs of litigation. Undoubtedly, there are instances where the
practice of fee shifting would be highly inappropriate, if not un-
necessary. For example, the considerations which argue for fee
24 Costs in the English courts are taxed by a Taxing Master, who reviews, and if
necessary holds hearings on, an itemized bill submitted by the prevailing party's lawyer.
While English costs rarely include the whole payment actually made to one's lawyers, they
also cover many items not allowable in the United States. See Goodhart, supra note 8, at
856-59.
25 In response to this criticism, one commentator has noted: "If New Jersey justice is so
much a matter of luck, it hardly seems worthwhile to have courts and lawyers; it would be
cheaper, and certainly less dilatory, to spin a coin." Id. at 877.
26 Two other objections to the English Rule are worthy of note. If fees are awarded to a
party, the court must still decide what is reasonable. This sometimes difficult and time
consuming task, Wilderness, 495 F.2d at 1031 n.1, though not totally foreign to the courts, is
obviated where a party has contracted for the legal services beforehand. This contractual fee
will not be reviewed unless the client himself challenges it directly.
There is also the consideration of the effect on an independent bar of "having the
earnings of the attorney flow from the pen of the judge before whom he argues." F.D. Rich,
417 U.S. at 129.
27
 Indeed, it has been suggested that resistance to lawyers early in our history and a
resulting lack of true commitment to making a successful litigant "whole" by compensating
him for what were, at that time, thought to be unnecessary expenses were the leading factors
in the 19th century atrophy of many state statutes providing for recovery of nominal attorney's
fees as taxable costs. See Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20
Vand. L. Rev, 1216, 1220 (1967). Typically, these statutes set fixed dollar amounts for
services, which soon were outstripped by the actual cost of legal services, and were con-
sequently "forgotten." But see Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great
Society, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 792, 798 (1966) (describing the setting of fixed amounts for
"reasonable fees" as a legislative mistake). Note also that some federal courts today do not
intend the award of attorney's fees to make the client whole. NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331,
1339 (1st Cir. 1973); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834, 851 (W.D. Tex. 1973).
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shifting in the adversary situations are absent in uncontested pro-
bate proceedings, real estate transactions where none of the parties
default on their obligations, or the preparation of financial state-
ments .for business purposes. Employment of legal counsel in such
situations arises not from controversy as to legal rights but simply in
the course of compliance with legal requirements aimed primarily at
orderly transactions and transitions. There is no initial allegation of
wrongdoing in such cases, litigation may not be involved, and resort
to the legal system will be primarily an administrative matter.
One party may still assume the fees generated by such legal
business but this would be an instance of contractual arrangement
rather than a concomitant of social policy. Should true controversy
arise, appropriate fee shifting mechanisms may come into play. 28
Indeed, in the commercial area there are now cogent reasons for
providing explicitly for attorney's fee liability in contracts should
such protection be desired, where the contract rights derive from
federal laws which are silent as to fee awards. 29
That the English Rule can co-exist with the American Rule in
the same legal system is illustrated by a number of exceptions to the
American Rule which have evolved over the years within the equi-
table jurisdiction of the federal courts. Of course, an award of
attorney's fees may be made when explicitly authorized by statute 3°
or where required by an enforceable contract or by contracts among
the parties to the litigation. 3 ' However, courts of equity have tradi-
tional powers to fashion relief in accord with overriding considera-
tions of justice, including an award of reasonable attorney's fees. 32
21 Probate proceedings actually involve a shifting of necessary attorney's fees to the
beneficiaries of the personal probate estate, since the decedent's personal representative will
charge the estate prior to any distribution. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 190, § 2 (1958).
The notion that a trust must assume the reasonable costs of its administration is the origin of
the "common fund" equitable exception, Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-33 (1881),
and text accompanying note 42 infra.
:9
	 F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 126-28. As long as it does not resemble a penalty clause, a
provision for the payment of attorney's fees to the party who must go to court to seek
enforcement of a contract, and succeeds, will preserve the value of the bargain and provide an
additional incentive to both sides to perform fully. However, it should be noted that the
Supreme Court has stated that the solemnity of a contract itself provides the only necessary
and allowable incentive to performance. Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 413
(1947), citing Restatement of Contracts § 339, comment f at 554 (1932); see Kothe v. R.C.
Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 226 (1930). The Supreme Court has indicated that it considers
"everyday commercial litigation" beyond the reach of available exceptions to the American
Rule. F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 130. See text at note 98 infra. Thus, fee shifting in that area will
be limited of necessity to situations where there is statutory or contractual authorization.
3° The federal legislation is of two types: (1) mandatory fee award to the successful
plaintiff, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970), and (2) discretionary fee
award to the prevailing party, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77www(a), 78i(e), 78(r)a (1970); 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k), 3612(c) (1970).
31 E.g., Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 493 F.2d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 1974); Alland v.
Consumers Credit Corp., 476 F.2d 951, 955-56 (2d Cir. 1973).
32 Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
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These exceptions are of paramount importance in the areas of en-
vironmental and civil rights litigations where substantial damage
awards are unlikely, 33 the expense of litigation is great, 34 plaintiffs
are often poor, and therefore attorney's fees cannot be met or gener-
ated in the normal fashion. "Substantial benefits to the general
public should not depend upon the financial status of the individual
volunteering to serve as plaintiff or upon the charity of public-
minded lawyers." 35
There are basically three "equitable exceptions" which the fed-
eral courts have utilized to overcome the inhibitions attendant to the
American Rule, the barrier which has long limited the practice of
public interest law to stoics and other brave souls. 36
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). In a large and vital class of cases, the federal courts have
awarded attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff in a statutory cause of action where the
statute neither explicitly authorizes such awards nor conclusively limits the relief available
thereunder. Typically, the statute will authorize such relief as is necessary, either at law or in
equity. See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, supra, at 10 (Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act,
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970)); Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)); Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298, 302 (5th
Cir. 1973) (Civil Rights Act of 1871, supra); Calnetics Corp, v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
353 F. Supp. 1219, 1224 (C.D. Calif. 1973) (Clayton Act, 15 U S.C. § 26 (1970)). However,
where the statute presents an intricate description of remedies that does not include an award
of attorney's fees, Congress will be deemed to have proscribed such relief. Firischmann, 386
U.S. at 719-21 (Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970)). An award of attorney's fees has also
been found a logical corollary to the right to bring a citizen's suit under a federal statute.
NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d at 1337 (Clean Air Amendments to the National Environmental
Policy Act, 42 U S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(2)(B) (1970)). Because the "implicit statutory authorization"
approach necessarily involves a consideration of the equitable power to award attorney's fees,
the discussion in this comment of the "equitable exceptions" is for practical purposes wholly
applicable to these cases.
Until the recent F.D. Rich decision, awards of attorney's fees in Miller Act construction
bond litigation generally followed the comparable state practice, since the Miller Act, provid-
ing the federal equivalent of state public works lien laws for subcontractors and materialmen
on federal construction projects, is silent on the matter. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a et seq. (1970). In
F.D. Rich, Justice Marshall, writing for the Supreme Court in an 8-1 decision, refused to
"judicially obviate the American Rule in the context of everyday commercial litigation . . . ."
417 U.S. at 130-31 (emphasis added). Furthermore, "lt.lhe Miller Act provides a federal cause
of action, and the scope of the remedy as well as the substance of the rights created thereby
are matters of federal, not state law." Id. at 127. Thus, the Court disposed of a long line of
lower federal court Miller Act decisions and indicated at least one limit on the expansion of fee
shifting under the equity powers. See cases collected in Annot., 4 A.L.R. Fed. 685 (1970).
53 Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp.
691, 694 (M.D. Ala.), affd mem., 409 U.S. 942 (1972). This may also be true of certain
antitrust actions. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1224
(C.D. Cal. 1973) (Clayton Act, § 7, 15 U S.C. § 18 (1970)),
34 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
55 Id. at 1030. "Only a private party could have been expected to bring this litigation,
and yet a private party is least able to bear the tremendous economic burdens." La Reza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
56 See NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 710 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Fee shifting is not,
however, solely for the pecuniary benefit of the lawyer. Rather, it is "to enable litigants to
obtain competent counsel worthy of a contest with the caliber of counsel available to their
opposition and to fairly place the economical burden of . . . litigation." Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1974).
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A. The Bad Faith Exception
Equity .traditionally takes cognizance of both the manner in
which parties to a suit conduct themselves before the court and the
manner in which they conducted themselves previously so as to
make the suit necessary. A plaintiff or defendant who is found to
have acted in bad faith in instituting or untenably defending a suit
may be punished by an assessment of attorney's fees. 37 Where a
state legislature failed to enact a reapportionment in line with con-
stitutional demands, 38 a school board inadequately desegregated its
schools, 39 or a state employer forced a professional employee to go
to court to obtain a statement of reasons for the state's failure to
renew her contract," courts have found an award of reasonable
attorney's fees appropriate in view of the "obdurate obstinacy" of
the defendants in necessitating the institution of the action to pro-
cure that which was clearly owing as of right.'"
However, a finding of bad faith or vexatiousness is not always
a prerequisite to an award of fees, and indeed there are broader
equitable grounds upon which to predicate such relief.
B. The Common Fund and Equitable Fund Exceptions
Sometimes, the successful prosecution of a suit will inure to the
pecuniary advantage of persons not parties to the actions, who are
neither financially responsible for the action nor bound by its result.
In Trustees v. Greenough, 42 the Supreme Court, noting that a trust
estate must bear the necessary expenses of its administration, held
that one who in good faith maintains the necessary litigation to
preserve a common fund, in which he shares with others not parties
to the litigation, is entitled in equity to recover his attorney's fees
either out of the fund so preserved or out of proportionate contribu-
tions from the other "beneficiaries" of the litigation. 43
The Court had occasion to further develop this exception to the
37 See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 5 (1973); IUEW v. Peerless Pressed Metal Corp., 489
F.2d 768, 769 (1st Cir. 1973); Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in En-
vironmental Litigation, 58 Cornell L. Rev. 1222, 1230 (1973).
Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 693 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
39 Bell v. School Bd., 321 F.2d 494, 500 (4th Cir. 1963); cf. Clark v. Board of Educ.,
369 F,2d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 1966).
McEnteggart v. Cataldo, 451 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1st Cir: 1971).
4 ' Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 705-08 (1974) (citing decisions below). See cases
cited in id. at 706-07 n.9.
42 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
43
 Id. at 532, 533. The Court established a right in the plaintiff to recover his attorney's
fees from beneficiaries of the fund. It went a step further in Central R.R. & Banking Co. v.
Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885), where it gave attorneys themselves a right to recover reasonable
fees from beneficiaries of a fund created or preserved for a client-beneficiary by their efforts.
Id. at 127. Accord, Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 165 (3d Cir. 1973). At least one commentator is highly critical of the
Pettus development and argues it has been maintained solely due to fraternal concern from
the bench. Where the nominal plaintiff is under contract with the attorney, the award against
the fund serves only to augment the lawyer's income. Dawson, supra note 10, at 1614, 1653.
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general prohibition against fee shifting in Sprague v. Titanic Na-
tional Bank." The plaintiff had successfully prosecuted a suit
against an insolvent bank. As a result of the suit, the plaintiff
acquired a lien on funds earmarked for repayment of sums deposited
by her in trust. A by-product of this litigation was that she estab-
lished, by collateral estoppel, an identical right for fourteen other
non-participating depositors. Formalities were deemed to give way
to the inherent power of equity: the plaintiff did not, and need not,
purport to sue for a class, nor formally establish a fund available to
the class. Where the practical effect is to create a fund beneficial to
others, then the court may "do equity."45
The common fund exception does not place the burden of the
fee award on the defendant, unless he is also among the beneficiaries
of the fund; or, as in the case of a corporate defendant, unless he is a
representative of the shareholder-beneficiaries. Moreover, it is not
necessary that a monetary fund exist or be created in order to trigger
the essentially equitable exception; any substantial benefit, including
an intangible one, may warrant fee shifting, as made abundantly
clear in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.," in the context of a private
shareholder's derivative action against the corporation for circulat-
ing misleading proxy statements in violation of section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 47 The "therapeutic effect" of the
lawsuit upon fellow shareholders and corporate officials alike was
deemed a sufficient benefit to warrant spreading the cost of counsel
over all shareholders by taxing the corporation, the nominal
defendant." It is also unnecessary for the suit to have reached final
judgment, and a settlement out of court will suffice if its terms can
be ascribed to the pressure of a lawsuit. 49
The pro bono publico lawyer often faces the same large and
powerful opponents as the shareholder's attorney, and therefore the
same magnitude of expense. However, he often lacks the fee shifting
advantage traditional in the shareholder's suit. 5° Environmental
litigation on the regional or national scale involves public policy
issues of serious concern; all the more so where it is predicated not
44 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
45 Id. at 167.
46 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970). Accord, Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir,
1957). The terms "equitable fund" and "common fund" are often used interchangeably.
47 13 U.S.C. 78n (1970). The Act did not specifically authorize the award of attorney's
fees, but neither did it circumscribe the court's power to grant appropriate relief, In addition,
the Court recognized the suit as vindicating the strong congressional policy of fair corporate
suffrage embodied in § 14(a). Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. at 396. It would be
helpful to compare the foregoing with text at notes 59-72 infra, regarding the "private attorney
general" exception in public interest litigation.
48 396 U.S. at 392, 394. The Court also noted that a monetary fund was not expected to
arise. Id. at 392. See also Comment, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 316, 326-28 (1971).
49 See note 91 infra.
3" See Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Adminis-
trative Law, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 618 (1970).
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upon common law notions of trespass or riparian rights but on
federal statutory law embodying strong congressional mandates."
Under a logical extension of the Mills rationale (one perhaps invited
by the Court's own broad language), a successful environmentalist
plaintiff may furnish a significant philosophical, aesthetic, or
pecuniary benefit to a group potentially as large as the entire na-
tional or world population. 52
Assuming that the requisite "substantial benefit" may be
shown, the Mills "equitable fund" approach still requires the poten-
tially difficult task of identification of beneficiaries and apportion-
ment of the costs among them after identification." For example, it
is difficult to decide whether the ascertainable class that benefits
from a single county school desegregation suit is all persons in the
county or in the state. It may even be argued that the beneficiary is
the entire nation through vindication of its commitment to constitu-
tional principles as embodied in the Civil Rights Acts. 54 A definition
of ascertainable class presupposes that the class is capable of
reasonably certain definition, proportionate to the scope of relief
requested. Indeed, in view of the recent Supreme Court decisions
restricting the relative ease with which Rule 23 class action suits
could be brought in federal courts," an ascertainable class for Mills
purposes might require precise definition.
In addition to the requirement of identifying an ascertainable
class, there is another limitation on the power of courts to award
attorney's fees. One large and powerful opponent could be the
federal government. At present, a successful suit against a federal
regulatory agency cannot result in an award of attorney's fees. This
would in effect be an award against the United States, and therefore
be barred by sovereign immunity, 56
 though Congress could legislate
to provide otherwise."
51
 E.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
52
 See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d at 1033 n.3, proceeding on the "private
attorney general theory." But see the dissenting opinions of Circuit Judges MacKinnon and
Wilkey in Wilderness which present the obvious "other side" of the environmental coin, the
economic dislocation which may result from successful environmentalist struggles. Id. at 1039
(dissenting opinions). Compare Wilderness with NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir.
1973).
33
 These problems may be superficial where a monetary fund exists because the "takers"
will either be known by then or will identify themselves out of self interest. A reasonable fee
may be allowed out of the fund. Powell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 267 F.2d 241, 242-44 (3d Cir.
1959). Alternatively, the fee may be charged proportionately as claimants appear. Gibbs v.
Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943, 946 (4th Cir. 1965).
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. (1970).
33
 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U,S. 156 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1970). For a discussion of the Eisen case,
see Note, 16 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 254 (1975). For a discussion of the Zahn case prior to
Supreme Court affirmance, see Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 543 (1973).
q 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as
enumerated in section 1920 of this title but not including the fees and expenses of
attorneys may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
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Mills could also extend into the area of private action directly
against the violating party; however, in large scale cases the same
problem of identification exists. Because of this problem, it is un-
necessary at this point to discuss the further difficulties of appor-
tionment within an ascertained class. One bright note is that where
the benefits are largely intangibles, there is likely to be little mean-
ingful difference among the beneficiaries in terms of enjoyment.
One commentator suggests that the.formal aspects of the Mills
equitable fund exception may simply be discarded. 58 This is un-
necessary since there exists an equitable exception to the American
Rule which affords a much broader base for fee shifting without
resort to even the liberalized language of the Mills fund.
C. The "Private Attorney General" Exception
The "private attorney general" exception promises to do for the
large scale public interest litigant what years ago the now-familiar
contingent fee did for the impoverished personal injury litigant. 59
Basically, the concept is not new, and flows rather smoothly from the
against the United States or any agency or official of the United States acting in his
official capacity, in any court having jurisdiction of such action.
The policy represented by the concept of "sovereign immunity" underlying § 2412, while
anachronistic, is so strong that attorney's fees and expenses are not even embraced within the
notion of "just compensation" for land taken by eminent domain. Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S.
362, 368 (1930); United States v. 23.94 Acres of Land, 325 F. Supp. 330, 332 (W.D. Va,
1970):
37 E.g., Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. II, 1972). See
NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1335 (let Cir, 1973); Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834,
849 (W. D. Tex. 1973).
53 Comment, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 316, 330 (1971), The most recent Supreme Court
application of the Mills rationale is Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
59 The contingent fee, a percentage share of the client's monetary recovery, made
representation of poor litigants economically feasible. See Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 103, 188
N.Y.S.2d 491, 494, 160 N.E,2d 43, 46 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960). The
contingent fee itself could not provide a working solution to the funding problem in the
environmental or civil rights area, for the most appropriate and available remedy in these
areas is usually the injunction, which would not generate a fee. See Note, 58 Cornell L. Rev.
1222, 1226-27 & n.32 (1973); Comment, 38 U. Chi, L. Rev. 216, 317 n.6 (1971); Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75, 85-86 (1963). The
environmental area has the potential for suits resulting in large damage awards if property
damage or personal health impairment is established. E.g., Zahn v. International Paper Co.,
53 F.R,D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971), where the district court found that each of four named plaintiffs
in the water pollution class suit could meet the ulinimum 810,000 amount in controversy
jurisdictional requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970) (some of the over two hundred other
landowners in the class "to a legal certainty" could not meet that requirement, and therefore
the suit could not be maintained as a class action). 53 F.R.D. at 431, aff'd, 469 F.2d 1033 (2d
Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 291 (1973). See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970) (conditioning denial of an injunction against
operations causing air pollution upon payment of "permanent damages" to plaintiffs); Jost v.
Dairyland Power Coop., 45 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1970) (remanding for a jury
determination of diminished market values of several farms and noting that plaintiffs could
return to court for additional damages should injury from the continuing nuisance increase in
severity); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 91, § 59A (1974) (authorizing double damages to property
owners injured by negligent oil spills on inland, river, and tidal waters).
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traditional willingness of equity to act where overriding considera-
tions of justice exist. "Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go
much farther both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the
public interest than they are accustomed to go where only private
interests are involved."60
The citizen who brings suit to enforce his rights and the rights
of others similarly situated, or to ensure that agencies of the federal
government properly discharge their mandated responsibilities,
"does so not for himself alone but also as a 'private attorney gen-
eral,' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority."61 It is at once an obvious and yet an inventive device
through which the courts may moderate the natural restraint on
expensive litigation resulting from adherence to the American Rule,
and at the same time effectively promote the participation of more
legal talent in the pro bono field. It is obvious, in that "[o]nly a
private party [can be] expected to bring [such] litigation, and yet a
private party is least able to bear the tremendous burdens."62 It is
inventive in that whether the courts acknowledge it or not, the party
against whom the attorney's fees are taxed acts as a conduit to those
segments of the population which receive the ideological and even
long range pecuniary benefit of the litigation. 63 A governmental
defendant not protected by sovereign immunity will be able to
spread the burden throughout its citizenry through its power to raise
revenue." A private defendant is likely to pass the burden to
" Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, A.F,L., 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
" Newman v. Piggie Park Enterps., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). "When the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would prove difficult, and
that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing
broad compliance with the law." Id. at 401. Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (19 70),
contains an explicit provision for the discretionary award of counsel fees. Federal courts have
subsequently concluded that in cases like Newman, where plaintiffs have acted as private
attorneys general, "the award loses much of its discretionary character and becomes a part of
the effective remedy a court should fashion to encourage public-minded suits and to carry out
congressional policy." NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 709 (M.D. Ala. 1972); accord,
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1974) (suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970), which is silent on fee awards); Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143,
147-48 (5th Cir. 1971); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86, 88 (4th Cir. 1971).
62
 La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
62 The so-called "conduit theory" is no stranger to the law. See, e.g., Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 440-41, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595, 597-98,
191 N.E,2d 81, 83, 85 (1963) (majority and dissenting opinions), extending the concept of
strict tort liability to the aircraft industry and cushioning the shock by awarding damages in
the wrongful death action against the manufacturer of the airplane, rather than the manufac-
turer of the defective altimeter, under the apparent theory that this manufacturer could better
spread the cost of strict liability, in terms of damages awards, to the beneficiaries of the
development, all of whom were users of aircraft,
The "conduit theory" analysis in the text does not appear in so many words in any of the
decisions found in researching this comment. However, it does appear as a strong undercur-
rent in the language of many of the courts. See, e.g., Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1973); cf. Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp.
691, 694 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
m In view of the concept of sovereign immunity embraced in the Eleventh Amendment,
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consumers of its product or service through the mechanisms of the
marketplace, through which consumers in return may be able to
register their disfavor with the defendant's activities by simply
withholding or reorienting their purchasing customs." In either
case, the benefit received is that of compliance with laws passed for
the protection of vital, inalienable rights."
It is evident from the above analysis that the Mills equitable
fund exception bears a striking resemblance to the private attorney
general exception. Comparing the two directly, however, it is im-
mediately evident that the latter is a more intuitive, flexible concept
than the Mills fund. Most significantly, the private attorney general
exception avoids the requirement of an ascertainable class of
beneficiaries, and can apparently be satisfied by a finding that a
school district, 67 a city," a state, 69 or the entire nation has
benefited substantially. 7 ° The benefit can be tangible or intangible,
or both. 7 ' More analytical emphasis may be placed upon policy
U.S. Const. amend. XI, there is currently a dispute as to whether fee awards may be levied
against state officers in their official capacity, and therefore against the state itself. See text at
notes 112-53.
65 Two drawbacks do exist to the benefit analysis. Choice among competitive products in
the marketplace may insulate beneficiaries of the litigation from the shifted "shifted fee."
Where public defendants are involved, powers of taxation may eradicate this inequity of the
private sector, though state boundaries may raise a different sort of barrier to full redistribu-
tion. Also, under the analysis, innocent private citizens ultimately pay for the transgressions
of remote corporations or government officials. It must be remembered, however, that the
purpose of the private attorney general theory of fee shifting is redistributive and productive
rather than punitive, in the sense of encouraging more "watchdog" activity where vital
interests are concerned. This type of public subsidy is perhaps a small price to pay for some
assurance that the laws will be at least known, if not faithfully executed and observed.
66
 This is not to imply that a clean, healthy, safe environment is a "fundamental right" in
the constitutional sense. Recent federal decisions have held that it is not. E.g., Pinkney v.
Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp. 305, 309-10 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 738-39 (E.D. Ark. 1970). The courts are in disagreement as
to whether the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970),
provides substantive rights beyond the right to have NEPA administered in good faith. See
Cohen Warren, Judicial Recognition Of The Substantive Requirements Of The National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 685 (1972). Compare
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 755 (E. D. Ark.
1971), with the same case on appeal, 470 F.2d 289, 297-300 (8th Cir. 1972). Compare Morris
v. TVA, 345 F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D. Ala. 1972), with Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473
F.2d 664, 664-65 (4th Cir. 1973). Note further that the question of national importance does
not determine whether an interest is entitled to fundamental right status. San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
67 Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 40-42 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd on other grounds,
416 U.S. 696 (1974).
65 La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99-100 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
Brandenburger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1974).
7° Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (C.D. Cal.
1973).
71 Compare id., with Wilderness, 495 F.2d at 1033. Hopefully, the courts will not
overwork the distinction, in keeping with the liberalization of standing requirements in recent
years by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1969); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
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considerations, because the private attorney general concept de-
volves not from mechanistic concern with the creation of a fund
shared by an ascertainable class but rather from an awareness on
the part of the courts that private enforcement of public rights is
necessary and should be encouraged. 72 Clearly, continued develop-
ment of the private attorney general exception to the American Rule
bodes well for the future of pro bono litigation, especially within the
field of environmental protection and .regulation, wherein the Su-
preme Court has yet to rule on the issue of fee shifting.
A discussion of several recent decisions, particularly Wilderness
Society v. Morton, 73
 may further redefine the application, limita-
tions, and horizons of the private attorney general exception.
II. THE EXCEPTIONS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
Wilderness Society v. Morton is the latest and penultimate
decision in an action originally commenced in 1970 to halt construc-
tion of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. 74
 The appellants Wilderness
Society, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc., and Friends of the
Earth requested an award of attorney's fees and other expenses and
costs related to the litigation, which culminated in a declaration that
the proposed pipeline project was undertaken and approved in
violation of section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. 25 Addi-
tional alleged violations of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), 76
 were procedurally foreclosed and therefore left
undecided. 77
The appellants sought to obtain the award against the appel-
Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 686-90 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-43, 751-52
(1972) (dissenting opinion).
Calnetics involved an alleged violation of the Clayton Act, and the restoration of
competition to the VW air conditioner market is certainly bound to have a beneficial financial
impact on national markets. 353 F. Supp. at 1224-25. In Wilderness, the role of the plaintiffs
in requiring the Department of the Interior to rethink its Alaska pipeline plans and in
inducing Congress to lay down more strict mineral development standards resulted in a great
therapeutic, intangible and tangible benefit of preserving and sensibly utilizing American land
resources. 495 F.2d at 1033-36.
72 See NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d at 1334; Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d
143, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1971); cf. Clark v. Board of Educ., 369 F.2d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 1966);
Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1957).
77 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. granted sub nom. Alyeska Pipeline -Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Soc'y, 43 U.S.L.W. 3185 (U.S. October 15, 1974) (No. 73-1977). Indeed, the
Court appears to have invited resubmission of the private attorney general issue. See F.D.
Rich, 417 U.S. at 130.
74 Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970). The court of appeals
remanded the case to the district court for determination of a reasonable fee, 495 F.2d at
1036, but the propriety of the fee award awaits resolution in the Supreme Court. See note 73
supra.
" Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 892-93 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 917 (1973). 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
76 42 U,S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
77
 479 F.2d at 848.
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lees, Rogers C. B. Morton and Earl L. Butz, in their respective
official capacities as Secretary of the Interior and Secretary of Ag-
riculture for the United States, the Alyeska Pipeline Service Com-
pany, and the State of Alaska. The propriety of the appellants'
request for expenses and costs exclusive of attorney's fees was ac-
knowledged by the Government, and accordingly these were ordered
to be divided equally among the appellees. 78
 The District of Colum-
bia Circuit further held that the requested award of attorney's fees
was, under the circumstances, highly appropriate."
The violations established by the appellants involved the grant
of a developer's right-of-way to Alyeska by the Department of the
Interior in excess of the maximum width allowable under the Min-
eral Leasing Act of 1920. 8° The court rejected the appellees' primary
argument "that, whatever the width restriction in the Act originally
meant, a settled administrative practice to evade those restrictions
took precedence."8 '
However, enforcement of the strict letter of the law was far
from the sole result of this litigation. 82 In the court's view the suit
served as a catalyst for deep and vital changes in federal environ-
mental posture and policy. In response to this litigation, Congress
passed amendments to the outdated Mineral Leasing Act of 1920,
imposing for the first time substantial charges and responsibilities
upon developers of government lands. 83 At the same time, however,
it removed the offensive restriction of the 1920 Act, thus clearing the
way for construction of the pipeline as originally planned. In so
doing, Congress also expressly ratified the environmental impact
statement of the Department of the Interior, which it deemed
78 495 F.2d at 1028.
74 Id. at 1036.
'" Section 28(1) of the Mineral Leasing Act originally provided a right-of-way width of
twenty-five feet on either side. 30 U.S.C. * 185 (1970).
81 495 F.2d at 1033.
82 Enforcement of the laws is a worthy achievement and the court in fact characterized
this aspect of the successful litigation as involving no less than the duty of the Executive
Branch to observe the restrictions imposed by the Legislative ... and the primary responsibil-
ity of the Congress under the Constitution to regulate the use of public lands." Id. The
resolution of this separation of powers issue had great therapeutic value. Id., citing Mills, 396
U.S. at 396. Circuit Judge MacKinnon, in his dissenting opinion in Wilderness, regarded the
separation of powers issue as grossly exaggerated, and especially inappropriate in view of the
fact that only Alyeska, the private appellee, would be paying any of appellants' attorney's
fees. 495 F.2d at 1041-42 (dissenting opinion). Judge MacKinnon apparently believed there
should be a punitive aspect to any award of fees, ignoring the rationale of the private attorney
general exception.
83
 Pub. L. No. 93-153 (Nov. 16, 1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
639. Section 101, amending 28(1) of the 1920 Act, requires the recipient of a right-of-way to
pay the fair market value therefor, and all reasonable costs of processing an application
(query—attorney's fees from suits such as this one, not otherwise taxable against the federal
government includable as reasonable costs?) and monitoring the right-of-way. Section 204
makes the operator of the pipeline strictly liable for damages resulting from use of the
right-of-way, and requires him to maintain a $100,000,000 liability fund to satisfy claims
thereunder.
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sufficient under the requirements of NEPA. 84
 The drafting of that
statement was also a direct result of appellants' persistence in court,
benefiting "the public's statutory right to have information about the
environmental consequences of the pipeline." 85 In turn, the impact
statement led to refinement of the protective stipulations embodied
in the amendments."
The suit was therefore instrumental in focusing Congress' atten-
tion on the environmental issues of the pipeline project at a crucial
stage in its development (the choice of a trans-Alaskan versus
trans-Canadian route) and on the nation's need for fuel resources
during the crisis winter of 1973-1974. Acknowledging the present
"commitment to improving and protecting our natural environment
as one of the most vital of current national policies" 87
 the court
found the intervention of Congress in the matter a clear indication
that congressional policy of pre-eminent importance was at stake. 88
Wilderness therefore falls clearly into the mold of prior cases
awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff as a private
attorney general. Its more unique and controversial aspects, how-
ever, illustrate the flexibility of this equitable exception.
A. Prevailing on an Important Legal Issue of Societal Significance
The clearest case in which application of the private attorney
general exception would be appropriate is one in which plaintiff
establishes numerous and gross violations of explicit statutory lan-
guage where the duty violated and the danger from the violation is
settled and certain. 89 Many of the cases under the Civil Rights Acts
See Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 203(d) (Nov. 16, 1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 639, 649.
85 495 F.2d at 1034.
86
 Section 203(c) of Pub. L. No. 93-153 (Nov. 16, 1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 639, 648, expressly makes the Alaska pipeline subject to these stipula-
tions.
87 495 F.2d at 1034.
88
 Id. at 1035. This dissenting opinion is less enthusiastic, viewing Congress' actions as
undercutting the court in disfavor of the delay from the suit, the losses it has cost Alyeska,
and the immeasurable losses it has and will in the future cost the Nation. Id. at 1039
(dissenting opinion).
89
 Perhaps it is best at this point to note the inherent lack of reciprocity of both the
private attorney general and common fund exceptions. Where a fee award is statutorily
limited to prevailing plaintiffs, the result is clear. E.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
But where the award is available to either party, at the court's discretion, the plaintiff is still
favored. Wilderness, 495 F.2d at 1035 n.2. In the regulatory area especially, the rationale for
taxing only losing defendants is that the fear of multiple damages and attorney's fees liability
not only aids compliance, but promotes settlement of controversies outside the courts, thereby
lessening the strain on judicial machinery. Hutchinson v. William C. Barry, Inc., 50 F. Supp.
292, 298 (D. Mass. 1943). Where fee awards are discretionary, the court can withhold the
award should a plaintiff not meet the criteria due to bad faith or the less weighty, "strike suit"
nature of his claim, Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957), The Wilder-
ness court noted that, had appellees prevailed, an award of fees would be unjustified under
the argument that the American Rule poses a significant deterrent effect upon potential
plaintiffs such as appellants. 495 F.2d at 1032 n.2. Such is likely to be the case in this area of
the law where plaintiffs rarely have the resources to personally support extended litigation.
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are of this nature, especially those where there are landmark deci-
sions on point to draw upon as precedent. 9 ° Yet resolution to final
judgment is not a prerequisite for operation of the equitable excep-
tions. A settlement out of court, ascribable to the pressures of
litigation, may be sufficient success, and in fact may represent more
of a success for the parties involved than would have resulted from
a protracted court battle. 9 '
In Wilderness, the NEPA issues never became ripe for adjudi-
cation due to the plaintiff's success on the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920 violation, although the appellants were forced to fully brief
and argue the other issues. 92 The majority was satisfied that the
NEPA issues were sufficiently interrelated with the Mineral Leasing
Act violation, and the unsuccessful prosecution of the former so
instrumental in developing congressional concern over the latter,
that an award was justified for all of the legal work performed
through this appea1. 93
Id. at 1032; La Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 101 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In the more
financially substantial area of commercial litigation, a defendant who prevails with much
effort and has perhaps effected significant changes in statutory or case law, could conceivably
qualify as a type of private attorney general, and recover an attorney's fee, without seriously
deterring future resort to the legal system by his opponent and others like him. (If a prevailing
defendant were to vindicate congressional policy by his success, his remedy would be the bad
faith exception, applied to the plaintiff.) But F.D. Rich has removed commercial litigation
from the non-contractual, non-statutory fee shifting universe, and, without further guidance
from the Court, this could include even the derivative action of Mills. Therefore, in view of
the likely chilling effect upon resort to the courts, it is doubtful that a case falling within the
Supreme Court's idea of "non-routine" litigation will come up, wherein a prevailing defendant
will receive an award of attorney's fees. As long as the award is discretionary, the policies
expounded in Wilderness are likely to prevail.
9° E.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterps., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Cooper v. Allen,
467 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1972) (fee award on remand), affd, 493 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1974);
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp.,
438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971); Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.) aff'd mem., 409
U.S. 942 (1972). It may also be the seemingly ever present element of bad faith which ensures
an award in these cases. See, e.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. at 693-94.
91 See text at note 49 supra. This may be true in the sense that both sides have incurred
less expense and have arrived at a presumably amicable resolution of their differences. See,
e.g., Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 164-65 (3d Cir. 1973); Yablonski v. UMW, 466 F.2d 424, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Powell v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 267 F.2d 241, 242, 243 (3d Cir. 1959); Lafferty v. Humphrey, 248 F.2d
82, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1957). In Yablonski, supra, a motion for allowance of attorney's fees as costs
in actions against a union by its members involved four separate suits. Despite the fact that
three of the suits never proceeded beyond the issuance of preliminary injunctions, and the
fourth failed to reach that stage, the court granted the motion. It noted that the suits had the
practical effect of making the union more democratic and dignified, as Congress had en-
visioned in passing the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. 401
(1970). 466 Fid at 431. The court also cited Mills for the proposition that the relevant inquiry
is not the technical posture of the litigation, but whether it has conferred a substantial benefit
on members of an ascertainable class, there being no need for a final judgment. Id. Clearly,
however, there must be some "final" action taken by a district court on some phase of the
litigation in order to reach the appellate stage, as appellants did in Yablonski. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291, 1292 (1970).
92 495 F.2d at 1035.
93 Id. at 1034-35.
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The dissenting members of the court were not satisfied. They
regarded appellants as having ultimately, though extra-judicially,
failed on the legal theory of their case. They pointed out that instead
of limiting the pipeline to the statutory fifty foot wide right-of-way,
appellants wound up with an amended Mineral Leasing Act provid-
ing for an even wider right-of-way and a congressional circumven-
tion of the NEPA through outright ratification of the impact state-
ment to which appellants objected. 94
It should be emphasized that the private attorney general ex-
ception is a flexible equitable tool. Furthermore, it is not of a nature
to require a scorecard of favorable judgments where more than one
issue is involved. The inherent power of the chancellor to "do
equity" allowed him to take into consideration all factors surround-
ing a dispute and to fashion relief accordingly. 95
Equity may reward the sacrifice involved in litigation intended
to open the avenues for social change as certainly as it may penalize
the litigant who opposes such change in bad faith through sheer
vexatiousness and obdurate obstinacy. It is undisputed that en-
vironmental concerns must form a significant part of our national
policy for the decades ahead." The appellants in Wilderness must
be said to have "prevailed on the issues" in the only sense in which
that criterion can matter in an equitable award of attorney's fees
under the private attorney general rationale: that a net benefit has
accrued to the public interest from the litigation in question. 97
94 Id. at 1042-43 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). See Pub. L. No. 93-153,
	
203(d) (Nov. 16,
1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 639, 649.
95 Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939). Accord, Hall v. Cole, 412
U.S. 1, 5 (1973). In Sprague, the Supreme Court noted that the award of attorney's fees is not
routine in nature and is better made at the end of the case than at an earlier stage, where the
conduct and practical results of the case are in the best perspective. 307 U.S. at 168. The
Court recently acknowledged, however, that the entire litigation need not be at an end for
attorney's fees to be awarded, since to so require would work "substantial hardship on
plaintiffs and their counsel" in long, complicated suits. Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696,
723 (1974).
96 Restoring nature to its natural state is a cause beyond party and beyond factions.
It has become a common cause of all the people of the country. It is the cause of
particular concern to young Americans because they more than we will reap the grim
consequences of our failure to act on the programs which are needed now if we are
to prevent disaster later—clean air, clean water, open spaces. These should once
again be the birthright of every American. If we act now, they can be.
President Nixon's State of the Union Message, Jan, 22, 1970, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1970, at
22, col. 4. On the other hand, the environmental movement reportedly regards Congress'
action concerning the pipeline, effectively overriding the NEPA, as a stunning blow. See
Kindleberger, Who's Watching the Environment? The Boston Sunday Globe Magazine, Sept.
22, 1974, at 22, 27 col. I. As with most things, only time will tell, but the philosophy of
national dedication underscored by former President Nixon has far from flagged. See, e.g.,
Wilderness, 495 F.2d at 1033-34; Exec. Order No. 11,752, 3 C.F.R. 380 (1974) (federal
facilities to demonstrate leadership in abatement of environmental pollution); Reis, Environ-
mental Activism: Thermal Pollution—AEC And State Jurisdictional Considerations, 13 B.C.
Ind. & Corn, L. Rev. 633, 633-37 (1972).
97 See 495 F.2d at 1033 n.3, quoting the Hónorable Russell E. Train, then chairman of
the President's Council on Environmental Quality and now Administrator of the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency.
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Would this formulation allow an award of attorney's fees to any
litigant whose suit eventually effected a change in either statutory or
case law, regardless of magnitude? Not every statute involves con-
gressional policies of preeminent importance. Furthermore, not
every lawsuit turns on policy issues of preeminent importance. 98
These are undoubtedly questions for resolution as matters of law
based upon available indicia of congressional intent and concern. 99
The equitable exceptions have always been subject to the court's
discretion and only a clear abuse of that discretion will warrant
reversal on appeal, in
B. Benefiting the Public Interest
In addition, however, the court in Wilderness had to determine
that the success of the litigants justified the time and resources
expended in privately enforcing congressional and national
policy.'°' "[T]he environmentalists—through long delays they al-
ready have forced—achieved the inclusion of strong safeguards in
plans for the Alaskan line. 3,102 Once more, the dissenters were not so
appreciative. Circuit Judge MacKinnon strongly objected to com-
pensating appellants for any part of their work in support of their
NEPA claims, the end result of which, he claimed, would have been
to subject the United States to further foreign control of its energy
resources.'" Circuit Judge Wilkey was even more critical in charac-
terizing appellants as "frustrating the policy Congress considers
highly desirable and of the utmost urgency,
911 The Supreme Court made this abundantly clear in F.D. Rich with respect to the
Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a et seq. (1970). 417 U.S. at 130. See notes 7, 32 supra.
99 In this vein, see Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v.
Texas Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974) and discussion in text at note 132 infra.
Congressional action, taken while the case was in the courts, severed all federal ties to the
highway project under attack, and was enough to negate plaintiffs' contention that the suit
effectuated important congressional policy, 496 F.2d 1026.
1 " Cf. Crites, Inc. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 322 U.S. 408, 418 (1944). This is not to imply
that review of such decisions is wholly foreclosed. The particular issues of law as well as
mixed fact and law involved are not usually subject to close calls, and that which involves a
decision of law is freely reviewable for possible mistake or misapplication. A fee award,
therefore, will not always be at the widest discretion of the district courts. For example, the
bad faith exception presents essentially factual questions which are more appropriately
evaluated by the court in the first instance, while congressional intent presents essentially a
question of law and thus is a question open to review. Compare Whitley v. Board of Educ.,
457 F.2d 940, 942 (4th Cir. 1972) and Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100, 111 (9th Cir. 1972), with
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterps,, Inc., 390 U.S. at 402,
1°1 495 F.2d at 1032. See Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir, 1957), where
the court recognized the principle of equitable allowance of attorney's fees, but proceeded to
find no benefit accruing from the suit and therefore no award warranted, id. at 540. See
Lcisner v. New York Tel. Co., 8 FEP 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Chastang v. Flynn &
Emrich Co., 8 FEP 378, 380-81 (D. Md. 1974).
1 ° 2 495 F.2d at 1034-35 n.5, citing 119 Cong. Rec. 1374 (daily ed. July 16, 1973)
(remarks of Senator Fannin).
1 ° 1 495 F.2d at 1040-41 (dissenting opinion). "When we subsidize lawyers to bring such
suits against our national interests we promote our own destruction." Id. at 1041 (dissenting
opinion).
1°I
	 at 1042 (dissenting opinion).
" 104 conferring no public
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benefit on the United States, and guilty of poor judgment in "assay-
ing just where the public interest lies."'"
None of the dissenters denied, however, the basic proposition
that it is incumbent upon the judiciary to evaluate as best it can
those factors which bear upon the very exercise of its jurisdiction.
They did not deny that an award of attorney's fees is an available
remedy, and they in fact affirmed that "[Offering perceptions of
justice and public interest are understandable and to be expected
• • • • "'" The question really amounts to the following; should the
courts determine firsthand whether a legal position adopted by a
litigant comports with the best interests of society; or should they
defer, in all but the most certain and established areas, to the
actions and inclinations of an elected Congress charged with the
responsibility under the Constitution of transforming notions as to
the public interest into public policy through legislation? The fact
that Congress has chosen to act in a certain area does not preclude
the courts, when presented with a conflict requiring resolution, from
considering the public interest implications and wisdom of their own
actions in that same area.
In determining whether the appellants in the instant case had
produced results contributing to the public benefit, the court took
into consideration the sense of Congress as expressed in the pipeline
resolution.'" The courts do not inquire into the wisdom of congres-
sional enactments in the socioeconomic area.'" Had the pipeline
resolution merely ratified the prior action of the Department of the
Interior, without erecting new safeguards for the environment, the
court would have been constrained to view the efforts of appellants
as having changed little and certainly as not having effected a
congressional policy of overriding concern, as required under the
private attorney general rationale.' 09
Here, however, there was more. The court appropriately
sought out the intent of the legislation, and by majority vote of its
members found it to be supportive of efforts to protect the
environment.'" The court was clearly not incorrect in determining
this to be an important national policy, and in concluding that
appellants had contributed significantly.
In terms of the original inquiry, therefore, where Congress has
given a clear, unambiguous indication of its policy and position on a
matter, the courts are generally constrained to follow it unless it
105 Id.
105 Id. at 1042 (dissenting opinion).
107 Id. at 1035.
in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 731 (1963).
1 " See, e.g., Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas
Highway Dep't, 496 F.2d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 1974). See text at notes 135-37 infra.
"° 495 F.2d at 1032, 1036. Indeed, had it been found not to be protective of the
environment, Congress would then appear to have ignored its own mandate in NEPA. See 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
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exceeds constitutional limitations."' But where, as here, Congress'
actions are open to interpretation, the courts must determine notions
of public interest underlying them and take into consideration all the
information available." 2
Courts do not operate in a vacuum; nor must they, or should
they remain oblivious to all that occurs outside the courtroom. The
protection of important rights requires effective remedies, 13 and it
was therefore appropriate for the court of appeals to award reason-
able attorney's fees to the appellants in Wilderness Society v. Mor-
ton as private attorneys general suing in the public interest to
vindicate a policy of the highest national importance.
However, Wilderness is hardly a single-issue case. It presents
additional problems which in terms of practical effect may loom
larger than the propriety of allowing attorney's fees as costs. One of
these is the question of the continuing viability of sovereign immu-
nity as a potential bar to assessments of attorney's fees against state
governmental defendants in the federal courts. 114
C. Putting a Premium on the Private Defendant
Once having decided in favor of an award of attorney's fees,
the Wilderness court was then faced with the problem of affixing
liability upon some or all of the appellees. Under the private attorney
general exception, of course, this should not amount to a task more
difficult than per capita apportionment among the named defen-
dants, since the object of the award under this rationale is not
punitive but rather redistributive and ameljorative. 115 However, the
statutory immunity of the United States to awards of attorney's fees
created a significant philosophical problem for the court in that it
was the Department of the Interior, and not Alyeska, which vio-
This was the reasoning of the Supreme Court in denying attorney's fees under the
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970). Fleischmann Distilling Corp, v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. at 719-21.
12 This was the reasoning of the Supreme Court in allowing attorney's fees under the
private attorney general theory in Newman, 390 U.S. at 401-02.
" 3 See Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation,
58 Cornell L. Rev. 1222, 1240-41 n.1 1 1 (1973).
1 " The concept of sovereign immunity is embraced in the Eleventh Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const.
amend. XI. The doctrine expressed in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), allowing a state
officer to be sued in his official capacity, proceeds under the fiction that the officer is sued in
his individual capacity because, when he is acting in contravention of the U.S. Constitution,
the supreme law of the land, he is automatically stripped of the cloak of state authority. Id. at
159-60. Five years later, in Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v, Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), the
Court found that his "individual conduct" still constituted state action, and therefore the state
was bound by a decision against the officer. Id. at 288.
1 " Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 14-15 (1973). Overriding considerations of equity could
result in a different apportionment, as might also considerations of relative economic size
among defendants, although the latter at best would enter sub silentio.
221
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
lated the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. 16 To tax Alyeska for
attorney's fees would appear to be a circumvention of the immunity
by taxing Alyeska "for a dereliction not its own." 117
The court avoided such an improper result by reasoning that
Alyeska was still the real party in interest of the government action.
It further reasoned that Alyeska had also actively defended the suit,
and consequently that Alyeska should properly bear one-half of the
award, thereby accommodating the congressional policy of
sovereign immunity as to fee shifting with the judicial policy of
promoting public interest litigation through fee awards. 1 g
The other reason that Alyeska was required to bear one-half the
fee award was that the State of Alaska was spared even partial
liability for attorney's fees. The state had voluntarily joined the
litigation as a defendant in order to present a version of the public
interest implications of the pipeline project that would be attuned to
the necessities of a developing region. 19 In reasoning remarkably
similar in form to that supporting the private attorney general
exception itself, the court determined that to tax Alaska• would
undermine "the goal of ensuring adequate spokesmen for public
interests. "120 Under that reasoning, a fee award to a prevailing
defendant might be necessitated under a "defendant's version" of the
private attorney general exception."'
Indeed, one wonders whether the court was not in fact demon-
strating concern that such an award against the State of Alaska
might be barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution.' 22
16 See note 56 supra. But see, NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973),
which notes that the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 apparently do authorize an award of fees
against the United States. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857h-2(d) (1970) expressly authorizes such an award
in any suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1857h-2(a) (1970), which, the court decided,
covered this action. NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d at 1338.
17 495 F.2d at 1036.
Id. Appellants will therefore "bear" one half of the attorney's fees which they were
under no obligation to pay to their pro bone publico lawyers. The court ordered that the
"reasonable" attorney's fees be paid directly to the law firm, and that the law firm should
return to appellants any payments they had made in order to avoid setting a precedent for
potential windfalls to non-obligated clients. Id. at 1037.
119
 Id. at 1036 n.8.
11° Id.
121
 In terms of burden of proof on the merits, there is a significant distinction between a
plaintiff who initiates a lawsuit and a defendant who responds to one. A defendant may
prevail by virtue of the plaintiffs failure to sustain his burden; his avenue to a fee award
would then more appropriately be the bad faith rather than the private attorney general
exception. There is a further difference in posture between an original defendant and one who
voluntarily joins to protect an interest in the outcome of the action which might not coincide
with the interest of the original defendant. Query, however, whether the distinction is
meaningful for these purposes, where considerable expense has been realized and argument
delivered by both sides on an issue of substantial public importance.
177 See note 113 supra. Of course, the third rational explanation could be that "the
equities" were not with an award against Alaska, but were with an award against Alyeska.
Dissenter MacKinnon formulates the majority opinion as follows: "(0111 companies are pros-
perous, appellants are poor, and therefore oil companies should finance both sides of this
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If such a bar were to exist, then each plaintiff acting as a private
attorney general and taking on a state or its subdivision or agency
would be wise also to find an available private defendant to whom
sovereign immunity does not extend in order to seek reimbursement
of his attorney's fees. Where the suit involves a governmental func-
tion, such as operation of a school system or construction of a public
highway, such a bar would go .far to extirpate the gains made in
recent years by development of equitable exceptions to the American
Rule. 123
The existence of such a bar has been argued often in the past.
Under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 124 a private citizen may sue a
state officer in federal court in order to obtain injunctive relief
against alleged unconstitutional official acts. He may not, however,
obtain damages. ' 25
Nevertheless, numerous federal court decisions since Young
have imposed financial liabilities upon state officers acting in their
official capacities on the grounds that such expenses are integral to
an effective equitable remedy. 126 On March 25, 1974, however, the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the permissible scope of relief
under Ex parte Young in the case of Edelman v. Jordan. 127 In a 5 -4
litigation." 495 F,2d at 1042. This may simply be the actuality in most civil rights/public
interest cases, where victims are "small" and offenders are overwhelmingly large.
123 The Supreme Court is not likely to reach the Eleventh Amendment issue in Wilder-
ness: (1) because it was apparently not raised below; and (2) because Alaska's freedom from
liability is not among the questions presented on the petition for certiorari, Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y., 43 U.S.L.W. 3096 (U.S. Aug, 20, 1974). However, La Raza
Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972), now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, 4
E.L.R. 10133 (1974), and likely to reach the Supreme Court whatever the outcome in the
circuit court, presents the issue squarely. In La Raza, the plaintiffs were awarded counsel fees
against the California State Highway Department and its Chief Engineer. Their successful
suit was found to effectuate the congressional mandate of § 4(f), Department of Transporta-
tion Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970) regarding the preservation of park lands. 57
F.R.D. at 99. The federal district court found no constitutional bar to the award against the
state officers. Id. at 101-02 n.11. Because the circuits are in disagreement on this question, a
detailed treatment is appropriate here. Compare Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 901 (6th Cir.
1974) (bar), with Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1974) (no bar).
124 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See note 112 supra.
123 See, e.g., Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226, 236, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 411
U.S. 921, rehearing denied, 411 U.S. 988 (1972). The possible individual liability of the state
official for unconstitutional acts is not at issue here, except as it may be assumed by the state.
See note 148 infra.
124 E.g., Harkless v. Sweeny Indep. School Dis., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970), which
awarded back pay to a reinstated teacher in a suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The court characterized the remedy as an "inextricable part of the
restoration to prior status . . ." Id. at 324. In Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973),
the court extended the Harkless rationale of equitable restitution by allowing an award of
attorney's fees to successful prison inmates in a class action against state and prison officials.
Id. at 302. Other cases speak simply of the inability of a state to shield its officers from a
lawful federal injunction and therefore of the inability to shield them from the legitimate costs
attendant thereto. E.g., Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 n.8 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Ojeda v.
Hackney, 452 F.2d 947, 948 (5th Cir, 1972). But see Ex parte New York, 256 U.S 490,
500-02 (1921); Williams v. Eaton, 443 F,2d 422, 428-29 (10th Cir. 1971); note 148 infra.
127 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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decision Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, declared that
retrospective liabilities against a state are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.' 28
Edelman involved a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief
against Illinois state officials administering the joint federal-state
program of Aid to Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD). The defen-
dants were found to have failed to process applications for benefits
under the program within the time periods allowed under federal
guidelines. They were ordered to conform in the future and pay all
past-due benefits for which there were outstanding applications.
The court of appeals affirmed.' 29
 On certiorari to the Supreme
Court, Justice Rehnquist initially noted that Ex parte Young did not
authorize any and every type of relief, regardless of how closely it
may resemble a money judgment payable out of the state treasury,
so long as the relief could be labeled "equitable" in nature.' 3 °
While most injunctive relief has an effect on the state treasury,
and much equitable relief has been granted where the remedy
fashioned by the Supreme Court required money to be spent by the
state,' 31
 the Court cautioned that such prospective expenditures are
an inevitable necessity and consequence of Ex parte Young. An
award of past-due benefits, on the other hand, is not a necessary
consequence of future compliance with the determination of a sub-
stantive federal question. Rather, it is indistinguishable in many
respects from an award of damages against the state. 132 It stems
from "a time when petitioners were under no court-imposed obliga-
tion to conform to a different standard [of operation]." 133 "It is
measured in terms of a monetary loss resulting from a past breach of
a legal duty on the part of the defendant state officials."'"
124 Id. at 678.
129 Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985, 999 (7th Cir. 1973).
3" 415 U.S. at 666.
' 3 ' E.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), where the Court remanded a
long and arduous school desegregation suit to the district court for prompt relief including, if
necessary, an order that defendant state and county officials "levy taxes to raise funds
adequate to reopen, operate, and maintain without racial discrimination" a free public school
system. Id. at 233. On remand, the district court declined to require that action, but instead
enjoined state tuition grants for use in segregated schools. Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 239
F. Supp, 560, 566 (E.D. Va. 1965). The grant laws were ultimately declared unconstitutional.
296 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (E.D. Va. 1969). The Court in Edelman attempted to distinguish
Griffin as a suit against a county, rather than a state, and as such permitted under Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 531 (1890). Although the rule is that county action is state
action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and a county defendant is not a state
defendant for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667 n.12, it is
hard to ignore the likelihood of state-level effects from county-level financial liabilities, which
the Court itself proposed in remanding Griffin, 377 U.S. at 233. See notes 147, 148 infra and
accompanying text. See also Brown v, Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (implementa-
tion decision). Furthermore, the counties in both Griffin and Edelman were exercising state
policy, Edelman, 415 U.S. at 684 (dissenting opinion).
132 415 U.S. at 668.
1 " Id.	 •
134 Id. (emphasis added). The Court noted that this was the first time it was squarely
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It took barely three months for a federal court to apply the
Edelman prohibition on retrospective liabilities to a request for an
award of attorney's fees. Named Individual Members of San An-
tonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway Department,' 35 an
environmental case, was brought against the Texas Highway De-
partment and the Federal Department of Transportation to enjoin
construction of an expressway through parklands. Immunity of the
federal defendant to a fee award was conceded. 136 The court re-
buffed appellant's claim to private attorney general status by noting
that Congress had, pendente lite, withdrawn all federal support for
the project, and therefore appellants could not claim to be effectuat-
ing any congressional policies since the project was no longer in the
sphere of federal legislation.'"
No bad faith on the part of appellees was found. 138 Further-
more, since any award for attorney's fees must inevitably be paid
from the general revenues of the state, even the limited claim of
appellants to services rendered through the first appeal was barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. 139
The deficiency of the Edelman rationale is that it breathes life
into what is essentially a distinction without a difference. Whether
an equitable remedy carries with it a prospective or retrospective
element requiring a disbursement of funds is of no real import
except as it may affect the state accountant who must record it and
the state legislator who must find the funds necessary to comply
with a lawful court order. In either case, there is a justifiable
increase in the state's responsibilities to those directly affected by the
litigation. 140
It is furthermore hard to understand just where an award of
attorney's fees fits into the Edelman scheme. It is not truly a pro-
spective expense incident to compliance with a decision of law,
except in the sense that failure to pay is failure to comply fully. Nor
is it a retrospective liability as that is defined by the Edelman facts.
There, plaintiffs were seeking funds wrongfully withheld although
they were entitled to those funds under existing legislation. Thus,
presented with the issue well-briefed and argued. While Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) affirmed a three judge district court decision allowing a retroactive award of welfare
benefits, the Eleventh Amendment issue, though orally argued, was not treated by the Court.
415 U.S. at 670.71.
135 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974),
1 " Id. at 1025.
137 Id.
I" Id. at 1026,
135 Id., citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
14° See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 682, 686-87 (Douglas, J.; dissenting). Legally, a state
official must obey the decisions and orders of a federal court prorierly exercising jurisdiction
with regard to federal rights. Moreover, a state official should have the interests of the state
citizens at heart, which are best served by rooting out the vestiges of the wrong he has
committed, by paying out benefits lawfully due. Id. But see Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d
226, 234-36 (2d Cir. 1972).
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they were seeking direct compensation from the state for an actual
pre-existing loss."' An award of legal fees, on the other hand, like
an award of court costs against the state generally, 142
 is not such an
award of damages, especially where there is no punitive aspect to
it; 143
 nor does the amount ultimately to be awarded "exist" even as a
potentiality prior to commencement of legal action. It becomes
certain only after the case is res judicata:. 1 A4 An equitable fee award
is an unique tool which the courts will wield to even out what they
perceive to be an imbalance in the final result of even the most
successful public interest suits. 145
The Edelman Court's concern with retrospective liabilities of
the state treasury probably stems from the notion that an award of
damages against a state would deplete its general revenues. In this
regard, a distinction has been made in the lower courts between
charges against current general revenues and charges against future
revenues which the state may receive. If funds have not yet been
collected or, if collected, have not been earmarked, they may be
applied to a fee award against the state. 146
 Obviously, the factor
present in such a distinction is the opportunity for fiscal planning
with regard to a fee liability. Yet, one test of whether an action is
one against the sovereign is whether it can, in any way, affect the
state treasury. 147
 Whether a suit is against the state is to be deter-
mined by the essential nature and effect of the proceeding, not the
identity of the nominal defendant.'" When the action in essence is
E 4 ' 415 U.S. at 668.
141
	
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 275 U.S. 70, 76-77 (1927); Utah v. United
States, 304 F.2d 23, 27 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 826 (1962).
143 The punitive aspect of the bad faith exception has never restrained the Court. See
note 169 infra.
144 Partial awards may be made at certain stages of the litigation, usually at the point
where liability is certain and only matters relating to the shape and implementation of relief
remain. See note 93 supra.
l'" See, e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 11-13 (1973); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949,
955-56 (D. Hawaii 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 408-09 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See
also DeThomas v. Delta S.S. Lines, Inc., 58 F.R.D. 335, 346 (D.P.R, 1973).
145
 E.g., Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1973).
147 Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 620 (1963); Harrison Constr. Co. v. Ohio Turnpike
Comm'n, 272 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir. 1959).
146 Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Courts distinguish between the immunity of the state
itself and that immunity as extended to state officers in the performance of their official duties.
The latter may be pierced through Ex parte Young; the former, absent waiver or appearance
in federal court as a proper party, is impenetrable. See Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1, 67
{S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. California v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340 (9th
Cir. 1961), modified, 307 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Dugan v.
Rank, 372 U.S. 609 {1963). But see Rothstein, 467 F.2d at 236. However, the state will in
effect assume the financial liability of its officers stemming from a federal court decision,
Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d at 302 n.2, provided it is not individual liability. Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 248-49 (1974); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-74 (1959). But see
Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 25-26 (N.D. Ca). 1973). The distinction is
irrelevant insofar as the general applicability of sovereign immunity as a bar to the award of
attorney's fees is concerned.
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for recovery of money from the state, the immunity is available even
though individual state officials are the nominal defendants: 49
But by the Court's own acknowledgement in Edelman, "pro-
spective" expenditures are a necessary part of equitable relief Cinder
Ex parte Young.'" Justice Frankfurter noted in his dissenting opin-
ion in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.: 151
The course of decisions concerning sovereign immu-
nity is a good illustration of the conflicting considerations
that often struggle for mastery in the judicial process, at
least implicitly. In varying degrees, at different times, the
momentum of the historic doctrine is arrested or deflected
by an unexpressed feeling that governmental immunity
runs counter to prevailing notions of reason and justice.
. . . [Gine of its results is the multitude of decisions in
which this Court has refused to permit an agent of the
government to claim . . immunity. 152
It must be recognized that the typical pro bono lawsuit,
whether based on constitutional or federal legislative guarantees,
comes to the courts fully charged with public policy ramifications.
Substantive rights asserted often go to the very core of our national
existence. Accordingly, as in the First Amendment area, such suits
may be said to occupy a "preferred position." 153 Where substantive
rights are not involved, but the interests are nonetheless socially
important, courts very often react in the same manner, in terms of
the extent and nature of relief available: 54 Edelman therefore be-
comes more of an enigma when viewed against the background of
fairly liberal advances in the area of civil rights in the federal
system. It represents a step backward in its sweeping prohibition of
retrospective equitable relief, though restitutionary in nature. As
noted, recent decisions have adopted the Edelman description and
have denied an award of attorney's fees on the basis of the Eleventh
Amendment immunity. It is submitted that this is incorrect.
The better view would seem to be that attorney's fees are
sufficiently similar to normal taxable costs so as to come under the
long settled practice in federal courts of allowing the latter against
an unsuccessful state or state official where properly under federal
149 Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422, 429 (10th Cir. 1971).
'°° Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667-68.
151 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
152
 Id. at 709 (dissenting opinion) (federal immunity).
153 See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89-97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The
Supreme Court clearly regards civil rights litigation as more worthy of fee shifting than
commercial litigation. See note 171 infra.
1 " See NRDC v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1334 (1st Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 297-300 (8th Cir. 1972) ("substantive rights" as
found by the court are actually very limited). But see Pinkney v. Ohio EPA, 375 F. Supp.
305, 311 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
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jurisdiction. 155
 A state loses a portion of its sovereign character
when it appears in federal court, whether under its own consent or
initiative, or under a federal law as a defendant, for the purpose of
taxing it with a successful opponent's witness fees, transcript ex-
penses, etc. 156
 It cannot be said to regain its sovereign immunity
when costs are extended to include reasonable attorney's fees. 157
Surprisingly, having created this dilemma in March with
Edelman, the Supreme Court appears to have resolved it in May
with Bradley v. School Board,'" a unanimous decision allowing an
award of attorney's fees for the successful prosecution of school
desegregation litigation against a publicly funded governmental en-
tity.
The history of this case is worthy of brief note. The district
court in Bradley had awarded attorney's fees under both the bad
faith and private attorney general exceptions. 159 The court of ap-
peals reversed, noting Congress' failure to include an explicit au-
thorization for attorney's fees in the Civil Rights Act of 18 7 1, 16°
under which this suit was brought, and reasoning that "in a statu-
tory scheme designed to further a public purpose, it may be fairly
accepted that it did so purposefully . ." 161
 While the case was
pending in the court of appeals, the Emergency School Aid Act
became law. 162 Section 718 thereof grants discretionary power to a
federal judge to grant fee awards in appropriate school desegrega-
tion cases. 163
 The court of appeals refused retroactive application of
the Act to this suit.'"
The Supreme Court reversed. Not only did the Court hold
section 718 applicable, but it also held that an award thereunder
was justified on the private attorney general rationale, petitioners
having vindicated a "national policy of high priority," the achieve-
ment of desegregation.'"
The second concern of the Court in Bradley was the possible
injustice of a retrospective application of the Emergency School Aid
165 See note 138 supra. But see Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939).
In that case, the Court was concerned with procedural foreclosure of the request for a fee
award as opposed to "normal" taxable costs. The question here is whether, given a seasonable
request, fees may be awarded against a defendant who is otherwise liable for costs. Analytical-
ly, attorney's fees and other taxable costs are the same type of expense—a necessary cost of
litigation. See Class v. Norton, 505 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1974).
156 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1970). See note 138 supra.
152
 Taylor v. Perini, 503 F,2d 899, 907, 909 (6th Cir. 1974) (Edwards, 	 dissenting).
158 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Justices Marshall and Powell took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
159 Bradley v. School Bd., 53 F.R.D. 28, 34-36 (E.D. Va. 1971).
166
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 32 supra.
1 ' Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F,2d 318, 330 (4th Cir. 1972).
162 20 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972).
I " 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (Supp. II , 1972).
' 64 472 F.2d at 331-32.
166
 416 U.S. at 716-21.
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Act,'" and of necessity, therefore, the possible injustice of an award
of attorney's fees against a state entity. Clearly, if such an award
were an impermissible retrospective liability under Edelman, then it
could not be allowed here. 167
The respondent, Richmond School Board, claimed that its
funds and existing appropriations thereof were in the nature of
matured rights, with which a court, through an award of attorney's
fees, could not interfere. In response, the Court flatly stated:
It cannot be claimed that the publicly elected School Board
had such a right in the funds allocated to it by the tax-
payers. These funds were essentially held in trust for the
public, and at all times the Board was subject to such
conditions or instructions on the use of the funds as the
public wished to make through its duly elected represen-
tatives. 168
Undoubtedly, this would be true of any government entity's
funds not already disbursed, and, for that matter, applicable as well
to the state's general revenues. If Bradley is to be reconciled with
Edelman, then an award of attorney's fees must be something other
than a retrospective liability against the state treasury. Clearly, the
Supreme Court regards it as such, and does not find it to be barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. Here, as it has often done in the
past, 169 the Court has upheld the validity and necessity of such an
award, and has done so in terms of the private attorney general
rationale.
Finally, the Bradley decision lays to rest any notions that a fee
award to a successful public interest litigant in some way intrudes
upon the legitimate expectations of the defendant. Neither section
718 of the Emergency School Aid Act nor the common law availabil-
ity of a fee award altered the Board's pre-existing legal respon-
sibilities to petitioners. Even assuming a degree of uncertainty in the
law at the time of the original complaint regarding the Board's
constitutional obligations, the Board was sufficiently aware of the
possibility of an award of attorney's fees through discussions in the
courts below. It might not have been able to predict the passage of
section 718, but it certainly should have known of the availability of
equity. 17 °
166 Id. at 720.
167 Statutory authorization or not, the award is still made under the court's general
equity powers. See note 32 supra.
168 416 U S. at 721 (emphasis added),
166 E.g., Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973); Newman v. Figgie
Park Enterps., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968). Certiorari was denied in the following cases
involving had faith on the part of state officials: Brewer v. School Bd., 456 F.2d 943, 951-52
(4th Cir.), cert, denied, 406 U S. 933 (1972); Griffin v. County School Bd., 363 F.2d 206, 212
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966).
176
 416 U.S, at 721,
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In the general context of public interest litigation involving
governmental defendants, this can be read as the Court's an-
nouncement that the equitable exceptions have come into their own,
and henceforth defendants in these special, "non-routine" pro bono
publico lawsuits"' should be aware of their availability and plan
accordingly.
It is submitted, therefore, that Edelman does not proscribe the
equitable award of attorney's fees against state governmental au-
thorities. Whatever significance Edelman may hold does not lie in
the realm of fee shifting, and insofar as Named Individual Members
of San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway
Department 172 relied upon the Edelman rationale in barring the
award of attorney's fees against the state, it is submitted that it was
wrongly decided and should not be followed.
CONCLUSION
The American Rule as to attorney's fee liability exerts an inher-
ent chilling effect upon resort to the legal system wherever the
pecuniary benefit to be derived from legal vindication of one's rights
is less than the cost of an attorney. The contingent fee, one way of
overcoming this institutional barrier to justice, is adequate where
there is the potential for a large monetary recovery. It does not
ordinarily lend itself to use, however, in the civil rights and en-
vironmental areas, where equitable remedies prevail. Injunctions do
not generate fees. Equity itself, however, developed three exceptions
to the American Rule to allow a fair apportionment of the real costs
of litigation, the most progressive of which allows one who sues in
the public interest in order to vindicate a national policy of high
importance to recover reasonable attorney's fees from the unsuccess-
ful defendants.
As evidenced by Wilderness Society v. Morton, this private
attorney general exception stands ready and able to turn the tide in
the vast sea of public interest litigation. Wilderness placed the
environmental movement and the pro bono publico lawyer a giant
step ahead. Reaffirming equity's inherent power to evaluate even
the extra-judicial components of litigation in arriving at relief de-
signed to meet overriding considerations of justice, the case clearly
171 "[Sichool desegregation litigation is of a kind different from 'mere private cases
between individuals.' . . . [I]t is not appropriate to view the parties as engaged in a routine
private lawsuit." 416 U.S. at 718. Compare this with the decision rendered thirteen days later
in F.D. Rich: "In effect then, we are being asked to go the last mile in this case, to judicially
obviate the American Rule in the context of everyday commercial litigation, where the policies
which underlie the limited judicially created departures from the rule are inapplicable. This
we are unprepared to do." 417 U.S. at 130-31. Whether the Court will further define
"everyday commercial litigation" remains to be seen. Bradley, however, clearly reaffirms the
ready availability of the equitable exceptions to pro bono plaintiffs. See 416 U.S. at 716-21.
172 496 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1974).
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demonstrates the flexibility of a theory of fee shifting which devolves
from considerations of social policy.
First, it allows the law to reflect important social change
through the encouragement of suits vindicating basic, though newly
emerging, human rights. Second, it allows the judiciary, tradition-
ally the slow mover, to reflect change sooner due to increased
exposure to societal problems. The law need not find itself out of
step with the times. Third, it facilitates enforcement of regulatory
legislation aimed at developing a safe, fair, economically viable
nation, by encouraging private citizens to serve as "watchdogs" over
those charged with the official responsibility for its growth and
maintenance. Fourth, it raises the stakes for private defendants and
potential violators who shirk their' social responsibilities. Fifth, it
redistributes the cost of pro bono litigation to a large portion of the
benefited public through further shifting by way of taxation or, in
the case of a private defendant, by the mechanisms of the market-
place. Sixth and last, its very existence works a therapeutic benefit
upon a society become increasingly aware that its very complexity is
causing it to lose touch with the controls.
State governmental and private defendants alike are open to
liability for shifted fees and, should Congress ever discard the anach-
ronism of federal sovereign immunity, so also would be the United
States. The Edelman prohibition on retrospective liabilities against
the states, it is submitted, is inapplicable to the unique tool of
attorney's fee awards. Despite this decision, the Supreme Court
gives every indication of intending to maintain and expand the
concept of fee shifting in matters of great national importance, as a
vital exception to its general commitment to the American Rule.
STEVEN LENKOWSKY
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